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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
TRUSTS-TOTTEN TRUSTS-The Rights of the Surviving Spouse and
Creditors in the Proceeds of Savings Account Trusts-Montgomery v.
Michaels, No. 45031 (Il. Sup. Ct., filed January 26, 1973).
Plaintiff Earl L. Montgomery, individually and as administrator of his
late wife's estate, filed a citation petition to discover and recover the pro-
ceeds from eight savings accounts.1 He claimed that these constituted part
of the decedent's estate, from which he was entitled to recover his statutory
one-third share pursuant to the Illinois Probate Act.
2
During her lifetime, the decedent, Bernice D. Montgomery, had created
eight bank savings accounts naming as beneficiaries here two children by
a previous marriage. The plaintiff, decedent's husband for twenty seven
years, alleged that the decedent had retained full control over the accounts
and possessed all indicia of ownership, including the right to withdraw any
and all funds on deposit. 3  The plaintiff testified that he was unaware of
of the existence of the accounts. 4 Thus, the plaintiff argued that the savings
accounts were illusory and were a fraud on his statutorily protected marital
rights, and, if sustained, would undermine his statutory share of one-third of
the decedent's estate 5 and his right to a widower's award 6 as explicated in
the Illinois Probate Act.7 He further contended that said bank accounts
were the decedent's property, that the accounts represented virtually all
of her property, and that the balance of the accounts should be turned over to
him as the administrator of the estate to discharge the obligations of the
1. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 183 (1971).
2. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 11 (1971) provides:
The intestate real and personal estate of a resident decedent . after all
just claims against his estate are fully paid, descends and shall be dis-
tributed as follows: First: When there is a surviving spouse and also a de-
scendant of the decedent: % of the personal estate and % of each parcel of
real estate to the surviving spouse and remaining % to decedent's descendants.
And Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 16 (1971) provides:
When a will is renounced by the testator's surviving spouse in the man-
ner provided in § 17, whether or not the will contains any provisions for the
benefit of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse is entitled to the follow-
ing share of the testator's estate after payment of all just claims: one-third of
the personal estate and one-third of each parcel of real estate if the testator
leaves a descendant...
3. Montgomery v. Michaels, No. 45031 (Ill. Sup. Ct., filed January 26 ,1973)
3, ajf'g in part and rev'g in part, 2 Ill. App. 3d 821 (1972).
4. 2 Ill. App. 3d 821, 826, 277 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1972).
5. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 11 (1971).
6. Id. § 178 (1971).
7. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, et seq. (1971).
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estate, including the funeral bill and administrative expenses.8
The Circuit Court of Lake County allowed plaintiff the amount of the
funeral fees and dismissed the remaining petition. The Illinois Appellate
Court for the Second District affirmed.9 Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme
Court of Illinois, which affirmed in part, recognizing the general validity
of the Totten Trusts in question and holding the proceeds of such accounts
available for the funeral and administrative expenses to the extent that the
assets of the estate were deficient in meeting such expenses. However, the
court reversed in part, holding, insofar as the surviving spouse was con-
cerned, these accounts were so testamentary in nature that they did not defeat
the plaintiff's statutorily protected distributive share in the decedent's estate.10
In the case In Re Estate of Petralia," the Supreme Court of Illinois
upheld the validity in Illinois of the savings account trust known as a Totten
Trust. 1 2  The savings account trust under Illinois law was adjudged to be
like other revocable inter vivos trusts which are valid' 3 except where they
work a fraud or sham on the surviving spouse's rights. 14 The court adopted
the language of Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 58 (1959)15 as the law
of Illinois. 16
8. Montgomery v. Michaels, No. 45031 (Ill. Sup. Ct., filed January 26, 1973) at
1.
9. 2 Ill. App. 3d 821, 277 N.E.2d 739 (1972).
10. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, §§ 11, 16 (1971).
11. 32 111. 2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 1 (1965), affg 48 Ill. App. 2d 122, 198 N.E.2d 200
(1964).
12. This trust is often called a "Totten Trust" since a leading case establishing
its validity is Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904). The New York
court in establishing the validity of saving account trusts as tentative trusts stated:
A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own name as trustee for
another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the
lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, recovable at will, until
the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal
act or declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or notice to the benefi-
ciary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or
some decisive act or declaration or disaffirmance, the presumption arises that
an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the
depositor. Matter of Totten, supra at 125, 126, 71 N.E. at 752.
13. See, Levites v. Levites, 27 Ill. App. 2d 274, 169 N.E.2d 574 (1960) (U.S. Sav-
ings Bond); Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955) (stocks); Gurnett
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934) (insurance policy); Bergman
v. Foreman State Trust and Savings Bank, 273 Ill. App. 408 (1934) (securities); Bear
v. Millikin Trust Co., 336 Il1. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929); Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 49,
54 N.E. - (1879).
14. Cases cited note 13 supra.
15. Tentative Trust Savings Deposit:
Where a person makes a deposit in a savings account in a bank or other
savings organization in his name as trustee for another person intending to
reserve a power to withdraw the whole or any part of the deposit at any time
during his lifetime and to use as his own whatever he may withdraw, or other-
wise to revoke the trust, the intended trust is enforceable by the beneficiary
upon the death of the depositor as to any part remaining on deposit on his
death if he has not revoked the trust.
16. 332 Ill. App. 2d 138, 204 N.E.2d 1 (1965).
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The recognition that savings account trusts are legally affective, though
revocable and within the sole control and direction of the trustee/settlor
during his lifetime, presented Illinois and other courts with an anomaly in
the development of the law of trusts. 17 Traditionally, the settlor in creating
a valid revocable trust had to divest himself of complete control over the
article by delivery of the article to a third party trustee, although he could
retain the benefits of the trust for himself during his lifetime.' 8  The interest
created in the beneficiary had to be in praesenti;19 otherwise, such devise was
illusory, and, therefore, testamentary in nature and failing as violative of the
Statute of Wills.20  In an apparent attempt to avoid the Statute of Wills
requirements, the court in Petralia held that Totten Trusts created an
equitable interested in the beneficiary in praesenti, although enjoyment of that
interest was postponed until the death of the settlor. 21  Instead of the de-
positor's death being considered a condition precedent to the creation of
the trust, the trust was held to be subject to a condition subsequent of
revocation.2 2 This reasoning adopted by Petralia is certainly unique to the
savings account trust. The text writer Scott noted:
It is clear that a similar trust of property other than savings bank
deposits would be invalid. In view, however, of the convenience
of this method of disposing of comparatively small sums of money
without the necessity of resorting to probate proceedings, there
seems to be no sufficiently strong policy to invalidate there trusts.
Not only is the amount involved usually comparatively small,
but it is easy to identify, and there is not great danger of fraudulent
claims resulting from the absence of an attested instrument.
23
This policy consideration probably accounts for the general acceptance of
the doctrine of the so called Totten Trusts in other jurisdictions, 24 albeit some
17. For a discussion of this point, see Note, Matter of Totten, An Anomaly in
the Law of Trusts, 6 De Paul L. Rev. 117 (1956); Sheridan, Trusts, Totten Trusts,
Initial Illinois Recognition, 15 De Paul L. Rev. 240 (1965). 1 Scott, Law of Trusts
§ 58.2-.3 (3d ed. 1967).
18. For a more complete discussion of this point, see I Scott, Law of Trust § 57.5
(3d ed. 1967).
19. Farkas v. Williams, 5 I11. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955); Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Trusts § 56 (1959).
20. 1 Scott, Law of Trust § 58.3 at 526 (3d ed. 1967).
21. 332 I11. App. 2d 137, 204 N.E.2d 1; I Scott, Law of Trust § 58.3, at 527 (3d
ed. 1967).
22. 1 Scott, Law of Trust § 58 at 527 (3d ed. 1967).
23. ld.
24. Enterprise Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Ehrlich, 337 F. Supp. 1332
(D.C. D.C. 1972); Brucks v. Home Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d 845, 228
P.2d 545, rev'g 220 P.2d 611 (1951); Reidy v. Almich, 4 Ariz. App. 144, 418 P.2d
390 (1966); Estate of Hall v. Father Flanagan's Boys Home, Colo. App., 491 P.2d 614
(1971); Cressy v. Fisher, 16 Conn. Sup. 391 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Delaware Trust Co. v.
Fitzmaurice, 27 Del. Ch. 101, 31 A.2d 388 (1943); Litsey v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n of Tampa, 243 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1971); Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 426, 4
S.E.2d 199 (1939); Hale v. Hale, 313 Ky. 344, 231 S.W.2d 2 (1950); Coughlin v.
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jurisdictions have specifically rejected them as being so illusory as not to be
trusts at all.
25
The convenience argument that is the underpinning of the policy
validating these trusts has been attacked in those instances where the set-
tlor/trustee has used this trust device to destroy his surviving spouse's ex-
pectant interest in his estate 26 or to place his property beyond the reach of
creditors. 27 In Montgomery, the Illinois court was presented for the first
time with a case where the surviving spouse, both as an individual and as
administrator of the estate, claimed that such Totten Trusts were illusory
and a fraud upon his marital rights, and that these accounts should be con-
sidered part of the decedent's property in discharging the obligations in-
curred by the estate. 28 Consequently, the court had to resolve whether these
trusts were valid under all circumstances or, under the conditions present in
Montgomery, were so testamentary in nature as to constitute a fraud on
the rights of the surviving spouse and the estate's creditors.
29
In determining if this category of trusts was properly regarded as being
testamentary in nature, certain jurisdictions have looked to the decedent's
intent or motive in creating the Totten Trust.30 In administering this doctrine
of intent, a Maryland court in Allender v. Allender"' criticized the doctrine
as not lending itself to a precise legal criterion.
32
In Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. 33 decided under Missouri law,
the Illinois court applied the intent test to determine the validity of a revocable
inter vivos trust against the claim of a surviving spouse.3 4  Under Missouri
Farmer's and Mechanic's Savings Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W. 166 (1937); In re
Shapely's deed Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 227 (1946); Bollack v. Bollack, 169 Md.
407, 182 A. 317 (1936); Leader Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hamilton, 330 S.W.2d
33 (Tenn. 1959); In re Madsen's Estate, 48 Wash. 2d 675, 296 P.2d 518 (1956).
25. Niklas v. Parker, 69 N.J. Eq. 743, 61 A. 267 (1905); Fleck v. Baldwin, 141
Tex. 340, 172 S.W.2d 975 (1943) affg Baldwin v. Fleck, 168 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1943); Wasco v. Oshkosh Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 183 Wisc. 156 (1924).
26. See note 41 infra.
27. See notes 63, 64, 65 infra.
28. In the case of In re Anderson's Estate, 69 Ill. App. 2d 352, 217 N.E.2d 444
(1966), the Illinois court was presented with a case where a widow claimed as hers
the proceeds in her deceased husband's bank account under 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 16,
but the court rejected her contention since they found the accounts to be revocable
inter vivos trusts. The court never ruled on the testamentary nature of Totten Trusts
in the case but intimated that they might be testamentary.
29. Montgomery v. Michaels, No. 45031 (Ill. Sup. Ct., filed January 26, 1973) at
2.
30. Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72 (1953); Martin v.
Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509 (1940); Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 43
Ill. 2d 312, 253 N.E.2d 417 (1969). See In re Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn. 183, 130
N.W.2d 473 (1964).
31. 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952).
32. Id. at 549, 87 A.2d at 611 (1952).
33. 43 Ill. 2d 312, 253 N.E.2d 417 (1969).
34. Id. at 315, 316, 253 N.E.2d at 419.
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law such factors as the imminence of the testator's death, the consideration,
or lack thereof, in the creation of these trusts, fairness to the surviving spouse,
the size of the estate, the amount otherwise left to the surviving spouse, and
the secretive nature in which the decedent acted in attempting to create the
alleged trusts had to be considered.8 5
In Mongomery, the Illinois court, as the Maryland court had done in
A llender, expressed its dissatisfaction with the uncertainty of the intent
criterion, but, unlike the Maryland court, rejected the intent test.3 6 Instead,
the court held that regardless of the decedent's intent, the surviving spouse's
statutory share should be protected as a matter of public policy. 37 While
recognizing under Illinois law the right during one's lifetime to dispose of
one's property38 under circumstances not tantamount to fraud upon the
surviving spouse's statutory share, 39 the court reiterated that the general policy
in Illinois is to provide for the surviving spouse's support.
40
The court in Montgomery next considered the "illusory or real" test
that developed in New York, the jurisdiction that gave birth to the Totten
Trust.4' In the landmark case of Newman v. Dore,42 involving a revocable
trust other than a Totten Trust, the New York court held that a surviving
spouse had an expectant interest in the decedent's estate, but such interest
in the spouses property was contingent upon it becoming part of the de-
cedent's estate.43 The test of a valid transfer is determined by whether such
transfer was "real or illusory."' 44 To create a valid inter vivos trust, the
decedent spouse must in good faith divest himself of ownership of his
property.45 It is of no consequence that his purpose is to destroy his sur-
viving spouse's expectant interest in his estate. 46 In Krause v. Krause,47 the
New York court extended the Newman v. Dore test to the case of a savings
account trust. The Newman and Krause test has been upheld in subsequent
The Illinois court reviewed this case under the law of Missouri since the Totten
Trust agreement was with a Missouri bank, the agreement stated that Missouri law was
controlling, and the corpus was in Missouri.
35. Id. at 316, 253 N.E.2d at 419.
36. Montgomery v. Michaels, No. 45031 (Ill. Sup. Ct., filed January 26, 1973)
at 3.
37. Id. at 2.
38. Dennis v. Dennis, - Ill. 2d -, 271 N.E. 55, 60 (1971); Holmes v. Mims
1 Ill. 2d 274, 279, 115 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1953); Padfield v. Padfield, 78 Ill. 16, 18,
19 (1875).
39. Cases cited note 38 supra.
40. Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 779 (1944);
Blankenship v. Hall. 233 Ill. 116, 129 (1908); In re Taylor's Will, 55 Ill. 252 (1870).
41. In the Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
42. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
43. Id. at 376, 9 N.E.2d at 967.
44. Id. at 379, 9 N.E.2d at 969.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941).
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New York cases 4s and accepted in Illinois. 4 9 In the case of Smith v. Northern
Trust Co.,50 because the provisions of the trust agreement between the
settlor and trustee rendered absolute control over the trust to the settlor, 51
the court held that the critical transfer was merely colorable and illusory,
and the widow was entitled to her distributive statutory share.
In the controversial case of In Re Halpern,52 the New York court ex-
tended the Newman and Krause "real or illusory test to its logical end: once
a savings account trust is found to be "real," the surviving spouse is deprived
of his or her distributive share of the proceeds contained in the accounts.
Fifteen months prior to his demise, the decedent had placed four savings ac-
counts in trust for his grandchildren. The plaintiff, executrix of the estate,
sought to include in the decedent's estate the proceeds from these accounts,
alleging that as trusts they were merely illusory. 53 The Appellate Division
held that the trusts were valid, but the widow, under Decedent Estate Law
of New York, 54 was entitled to her one-third statutory share from the pro-
ceeds. The New York Court of Appeals, while affirming the lower court's
opinion, rejected in strong dicta, there being no appeal taken on this point
the motion that under New York law the widow was entitled to her one-third
statutory share where a valid tentative trust had been created. The court
said: "We see no power in the court to divide up such a Totten Trust and
call part of it illusory and the other part good." 5 5
The New York Legislature in response to the Halpern decision amended
48. See, e.g. Steixner v. Bowery Savings Bank, 86 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1949);
MacGregor v. Fox, 280 App. Div. 435, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1952); In re Phipp's Estate,
125 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sur. Ct. 1963).
49. Dennis v. Dennis, - Ill. 2d -, 271 N.E.2d 55 (1971); Holmes v. Mims, 1
I11. 2d 274 (1953); Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 779
(1944).
50. 322 Il. App. 168, 179, 54 N.E. 779 ,783 (1944).
51. Id. Under the terms of the trust agreement by which the settlor reserved the
right to revoke, alter or amend the agreement, any request by the settlor for any part
of the principal was held to be equivalent to a command. The trust agreement re-
served to the settlor a veto over the sale, disposition, or investment of the trust assets
by the trustee and gave to the settlor the power to direct and control any change in
the securities or any investments of the trust funds.
52. 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951) affg 277 App. Div. 525, 100 N.Y.S.2d
894 (1950) modifying 197 Misc. 502, 96 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sur. Ct. 1950), noted in 15
Albany L. Rev. 254, 16 Albany L. Rev. 113, 18 Brooklyn L. Rev. 328, 1 Buffalo L.
Rev. 40, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 512, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 783, 25
N.Y.U. L. Rev. .920, and 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 306.
53. 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).
54. New York Decedent Estate Law § 18(a) prior to insertion of law 1965 C. 665.
55. 303 N.Y. 40, 100 N.E.2d at 123.
The court did not reverse the Appellate Division holding because that part of the
decree which was against the beneficiary and in favor of the widow was not appealed.
The Halpern decision was followed in e.g., Matter of Ward, 279 App. Div. 616, 107
N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Matter of Purcell, 200 Misc. 643, 107 N.Y.S.2d 955
(Sur. Ct. 1951); Matter of Aybar, 203 Misc. 372, 116 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Sur. Ct. 1952);
In re Friesings Estate, 123 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sur. Ct. 1953). But see Getz v. Get', 101
N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sur. Ct. 1950).
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its probate statute 6 to protect the surviving spouse's marital rights against
the Totten type savings account. Other states have followed this lead in enact-
ing similar statutes.
57
In Montgomery, the Halpern decision was severely criticized as being in
contravention of the established public policy of Illinois. 58 The Supreme
Court of Illinois rejected it on the basis of the following argument found in
Scott's treatise on trusts:
It would seem that a strong argument could be made against this re-
sult, on the grounds that it violates the policy of the statute which
gives a distributive share of the decedent's estate to the surviving
spouse. It is true that it is generally held that the creation of a
revocable trust is sufficient to cut out the surviving spouse, at least
if the settlor does not reserve too great a control over the property.
In the case of the savings account trust, however, the depositor re-
serves such complete control that it would seem that, even though
the trust is valid against the personal representative of the depositor,
it should not be valid as against the surviving spouse. Certainly the
policy underlying the statute protecting the surviving spouse is
stronger than the policy underlying the statute providing for certain
formalities to evidence a testamentary disposition. It may well be
held that the creation of a savings deposit is valid but not effective
to cut out the surviving spouse. 59
The supreme court in Montgomery ultimately concluded that "the con-
trol retained over a savings account trust is so complete that even though the
trust is valid, it should not be so as against the surviving spouse." 60  This
means that a Totten Trust is testamentary to the extent that it will not stand
against the renunciation of the surviving spouse, who, by renouncing it,
can defeat its operation. It cannot deprive the surviving spouse of his or her
distributive statutory share in the estate of the deceased. The court thereby
accepted as the law of Illinois the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 61 which
states that regardless of whether or not the trust is real, such a trust is to be
56. New York Decedent Estate Law § 18(a) (as inserted by law 1965 C. 665)
provides that after Aug. 31, 1966, money left in a savings account trust for one other
than the surviving spouse will be treated as a testamentary disposition and will be
included in the net estate for the surviving spouse's elective right.
57. Mo. Rev. Stat. 474.150(1) (1959). This law provides that gifts made in
fraud of marital rights will be treated as testamentary. Pa. Stats. Ann. (Purdon), tit.
20 § 301.11. A conveyance where a person retains the power of revocation or con-
sumption of the principal will be treated as a testamentary disposition if the surviving
spouse so elects.
58. Montgomery v. Michaels, No. 45031 (Ill. Sup. Ct., filed January 26, 1973)
at 4.
59. ld.; 1 Scott, Law on Trusts § 58.5 at 546, 547 (3d ed. 1967). Also see Bogert,
Law of Trusts and Trustees § 47 at 340-341 (2d ed. 1965).
60. Montgomery v. Michaels, No. 45031 (Ill. Sup. Ct., filed January 26, 1973) at
4.
61. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 58, comment e at 157-158 (1959):
(e) Restrictions on testamentary disposition. Although the surviving
spouse in claiming his or her statutory distributive share of the estate of the
decedent is not entitled to include in the estate property transferred during his
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treated as part of the decednt's estate in calculating the surviving spouse's
distributive share. Where the assets of the estate are insufficient to provide
for the surviving spouse's distributive share, the court is to direct payment
of the amount necessary from the trust account monies to make up such
deficiency, and the beneficiaries of such accounts are to retain the residue.
In discussing the rights of creditors in these accounts, the court sum-
marily held that, if the funds available in the decedent's estate were insuffi-
cient to cover the funeral bill, the expenses incurred administering the estate,
or other debts of the estate, the court could direct payment of these debts from
the proceeds of the Totten Trust accounts, but that the accounts were not
chargeable with the payment of legacies. 62 The court in reaching this deci-
sion relied on as authority the case law as developed in New York which
holds that the presumption or inference of the validity of the Totten Trusts
is rebuttable to the extent necessary to make up the estate's deficiency in ad-
ministering63 and discharging its obligations. 64 This same conclusion has been
supported in the Second Restatement of Trusts65 and by Scott who reasoned:
lifetime by the decedent in trust for himself for life with remainder to others,
even though the decedent reserves a power of revocation (see § 57, comment
c), the surviving spouse of a person who makes a savings deposit upon a
tentative trust can include the deposit in computing the share to which such
surviving spouse is entitled. Although the amount which the surviving spouse
is entitled to receive is measured by the sum of the decedent's owned assets
and the amount of such deposits, the owned assets are to be first applied to
the satisfaction of the claim of the surviving sopuse.
62. Montgomery v. Michaels, No. 45031 (Ill. Sup. Ct., filed January 26, 1973)
at 4.
63. In Matter of Reich's Estate, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y.S. 623, 628 (Sur. Ct.
1933). The New York court held that the presumption of the creation of an absolute
trust upon the death of the depositor in a Totten Trust would yield to the inference of
a desire for a decent burial and a solution of just obligations, and that so much of
the funds necessary to pay off such debts could be charged against it. Accord, e.g.,
In re Matthew's Estate, 175 Misc. 524, 24 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sur. Ct. 1940); In re Aybar's
Estate, 203 Misc. 372, 116 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Sur. Ct. 1952); In re Walsh's Estate, 23
Misc. 2d 873, 200 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sur. Ct. 1960).
64. In Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N.Y.S. 529 (1908), the
New York court stated:
One may no more get his money out of reach of his creditors after his
death by depositing it in such a way, not to belong to his cestui until he dies,
then he could do so by means of a will giving it to such cestui. His right
to the absolute disposition of it during his lifetime makes it his and therefore
subject to his creditors. See, e.g., In re Will of Morton, 61 Misc. 2d 624, 305
N.Y.S.2d 555 (Sur. Ct. 1969); In re Halbauer's Estate, 34 Misc. 2d 458, 228
N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sur. Ct. 1962).
65. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 58, commented at 160 (1959) provides:
Creditors of depositor. Although creditors of the settlor cannot reach the
trust properly merely because he has reserved a power of revocation (see § 330,
comment o), creditors of a person who makes a savings deposit upon a tenta-
tive trust can reach his interest, since he has such extensive powers over the
deposit as to justify treating him as in substance the unrestricted owner of the
deposit. So also, on the death of the depositor if the deposit is needed for
the payment of his debts, his creditors can reach it. So also, if it is needed
it can be applied to the payment of his funeral expenses and the expenses of
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Even though the trust is considered as arising when the deposit is
made, the depositor has such complete control over it that the situa-
tion is distinguishable from the ordinary situation where a settlor
merely reserves a power of revocation. In substance the deposit
belongs to him as long as he lives, and it is only just to permit his
creditors to reach it.66
This result is certainly subject to criticism. James, in Illinois Probate Law
and Practice,67 argues that such result is illogical when, as in Illinois, the
trust is treated as creating a present interest in the beneficiary during the
lifetime of the depositor. James suggests, as did the federal district court in
Gross v. Douglas State Bank,68 that a creditor could only attack the accounts
if they were fraudulent.
While the court's adoption of the Restatement rule in determining the
rights of the surviving spouse and creditors in the proceeds of Totten Trusts
avoids both the inequities of the In Re Halpern Estate rule and the uncertain-
ties of the Maryland rule, the court seems to have come to a hasty decision
without first measuring the real effects of its decision. Indeed, the court
in its opinion ignored the disruptive effect such a ruling would have on the
bank's position:
If a bank is required to defer payment of a Totten account until pay-
ment of all items indicated by the court, the burden and exposure to
liability may be too great to warrant acceptance of the account.
Most Totten Trusts are modest in amount. To turn the bank into a
great quasiadministrator and the trust into an informal probate pro-
ceeding does not befit the size or importance of Totten accounts and
tends to destroy their usefullness as an estate planning tool in
modest estates.
69
While there is no question that the court has the authority "to subject this
judicially created doctrine to such limitations as are necessary to prevent the
defeat of substantive statutory policies"7 0 and to accept the developed case
law of other jurisdictions as persuasive authority,7 1 one might question the
efficacy of such a ruling without first giving notice to the legislature so that
they can respond to the issues at hand.7 2 This is not to say that the legisla-
the administration of his estate, if he has not sufficient other property which
can be applied for these purposes.
66. 1 Scott, Law of Trusts § 58.5 at 546-47 (3d ed. 1967).
67. 2 James, Illinois Probate Law and Practice § 43.99(g) (Supp. 1972).
68. 261 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Kan. 1965).
69. Probate and Trust Newsletter, Ill. Bar Center, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Dec. 1972).
In dispersing funds from Totten Trusts, the court in Montgomery v. Michaels, no.
45031 Ill. Sup. Ct., filed January 26, 1973) made no mention of the duties and obli-
gations of banks under the Ill. Banking Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 162, § 145 (1971)).
70. In re Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn. 195, 196, 130 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1964).
71. Illinois Ins. Co. v. Rose, 93 Ill. App. 2d 329, 235 N.E.2d 675 (1968); Aage-
son v. Munson, 25 Ill. App. 2d 336, 166 N.E.2d 637 (1960).
72. In re Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964). The court
prospectively overruled itself in adopting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 58, com-
ment e (1959) as the law of Minnesota.
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ture can foresee the myriad of problems that might arise,73 but the legislature
is at least in a much better position through legislative findings to determine
how best to ameliorate the problems inherent in the abrupt changes of law
affecting substantial numbers of people and commercial interests.
The court will have the opportunity to address itself to these issues
since it has ordered a rehearing of the Montgomery v. Michaels case for that
purpose together with reconsideration of a procedural issue.
DAVID COHEN
73. In the case of In re Klienerman's Estate, 319 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sur. Ct. 1971),
the N.Y. court addressed itself to the effect of the Decedent Estate Law 18(a) (as
inserted by law 1965 C. 665) upon changes in beneficiaries or alterations in Totten
Trusts made after the effective date of the statute since the statute was silent on these
matters.
